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RECENT DECISIONS

contractor who does dangerous and highly specialized work is not doing
work traditionally done by seamen. It is not dear from the decision
whether Halecki was denied the use of the doctrine because of the
specialized work or the fact that it was dangerous. With the complexity
of modern ships it is difficult to visualize many jobs that will not require
specialized skills or be dangerous. The Court should have overruled the
Sieracki and Hawn cases or should have followed the trend these cases
created. In either event it is unfortunate that they left the lower courts
no workable guide for determining what constitutes "seamen's work."
Once again the hazards of the sea have their equal in the hazards of
judicial review.
WILLiAm TELZROW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - UNIFORM LAW TO SECURE
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES UPHELD

Respondent O'Neill, a citizen of Illinois, had traveled to Florida to
attend a convention. A New York judge, acting through a Florida circuit court, summoned him to testify in a grand jury proceeding in New
York. The Florida court refused 1 to grant this request made pursuant to
a Florida statute2 entitled the "Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of
3
Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings."
The court held that the statute was unconstitutional on the ground that
it contained no provision for bail and, hence, violated due process of
law.4 In most jurisdictions a witness may enter into a recognizance with
the court to appear and testify and the judge may require such witness
to post bail as a guarantee of his appearance.5 It is only after the witness fails to comply with the recognizance that he may be jailed. The
Uniform Act did not provide for such bail. The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed 7 the decision on other grounds, viz., that the statute violated the
1. In re O'Neill, 9 Fla. Supp. 153 (Cir. Ct. 1956).
2. FI.A. STAT. § 942.02 (1957). This uniform act is also in effect in forty-three
other states and Puerto Rico.
3. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANN. 86 (1957).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; "... nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law... "
5. Omo REv. CODE § 2937.16.
6. OHio REV. CODE § 2937.18.
7. Application of New York, 100 So.2d 149 (Fla. 1958).
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privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment8 by abridging the right of citizens to move freely among the states.9
In overruling the Florida court the United States Supreme Court declared' that the "fugitive from justice" clause" of the federal constitution
did not deny the states the privilege to formulate, through cooperation, an
agreement to deliver witnesses from one state to another in criminal
cases; that the obligation to testify did not interfere with the witness's
right of ingress and egress, for in this day and age a person can travel
rapidly and conveniently from state to state. Furthermore, O'Neill was
required to stay in New York for only one day. The Court added that
the statute applied to residents as well as non-residents and therefore was
not discriminatory.
The Court based its decision largely on policy, stating that this type
of agreement facilitated comity among the states, and to hold that this
and other similar arrangements are beyond the power of the states because there is no specific provision in the Constitution would hobble the
effective functioning of our federalism. The United States Supreme Court
found that O'Neill was afforded procedural due process as he was given a
hearing to determine if his testimony was necessary, if the trip would be
an undue hardship, and whether he would be accorded immunity from
judicial process in the states through which he traveled.
The matter of bail, which was the basis of the Florida lower court's
decision, was not reviewed, as it was not discussed by the Florida Supreme
Court.
The dissent declared that O'Neill's right of ingress and egress 12 was
violated, and to say that -he would be gone only temporarily was begging
the question. They said a state could compel a citizen to travel from
one state to another only if he were a fugitive from justice,' 3 and O'Neill
was not. The minority accused the majority of amending Article Four,
Section Two, of the Constitution to include "witnesses." The dissent also
said that Congress had completely pre-empted the field of interstate de8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...."
9. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (Wall) 35 (1867). The Court stated that the
right of a person to travel between the states without restraint is a right he possesses
as a national citizen.

10. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; "A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,
or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up,
to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime."
12. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12 (1959) (dissent).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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livery of witnesses by making it a crime for a person to flee interstate
to avoid giving testimony in certain criminal cases.14
The uniform act is efficacious because it removes restrictions imposed on the states due to their limited jurisdiction. The only other
means that a state has to procure the testimony of a witness outside its
territory is through the use of depositions or, if the case comes within its
provisions, use of the Fugitive Felon Act.1 5 Compelling the states to use
depositions would be impractical because of the defendant's right of confrontment.J6 The federal act covers only the situation where the witness
flees interstate to avoid giving testimony and is not applicable when the
witness remains in one state or has no intent to avoid testifying.7' These
limitations make necessary the uniform statutes.
Some difficulties may arise as a consequence of the uniform act.
Officers know how to handle a fugitive in escorting him from state to
state, but a witness presents a different problem. Can he be escorted
in handcuffs if he refuses to accompany the officer? If he attempts to
escape may he be subdued as a common criminal? The best answer
that can be given is to attempt to draw an analogy from statutes which
compel a local witness to testify in criminal proceedings. Most of these
statutes permit the court -to jail the witness if he refuses to testify or
enter into a recognizance with the court.' Thus, if a witness may be
jailed for refusing to testify, it would seem that he could be compelled
against his will to 'travel from one state to another without violating the
fourteenth amendment.
The only valid objection to the statute itself is that it does not provide
for bail. The Court's refusal to entertain this issue could be interpreted as
a desire to uphold the constitutionality of the law in general with a hint
that something should be done to provide an opportunity for bail. If
some provision is not made for bail, the Court may rule differently the
next time the statute comes before them and the issue of bail is raised.
Because of this factor a few states 'have amended the uniform statute to
provide for bail' 9 The bail amendment should be followed in other
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1952).
15. Ibid.
16. OHIO Rnv. CODE § 2945.53 provides that the accused shall have the opportunity to be present in person at the taking of a deposition to be used by or against him.
17. In Barrow v. Owen, 89 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1937), the court declared that mere
absence from the state of prosecution was not sufficient proof of the crime under
the fugitive felon act.
18. Omo REv. CODE § 2937.18.
19. See AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1863(B) (1956); CAL. PEN. CODE
1334.3 (1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:152.1 (1951); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, §5 618, 619 (1957); MIss. CODE ANN. § 1895 (Recompilation 1956); MONT.
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jurisdictions rather than take the risk of nullifying a useful statute.
Whether the lack of opportunity to post bail presents an undue -hardship
and denies the witness procedural due process can only be determined
when the question is decided by the Supreme Court.
In upholding the constitutionality of the uniform act, the Court has
permitted the states to employ an effective and expedient device for securing the testimony of witnesses who may be scattered throughout the
nation.
WI.LLM SL1VKA
REv. CoDE ANN. § 94.9003(2) (Supp. 1957); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.
618-a(3) (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 622.2 (Purdon Supp. 1957); R-1.
GEN. LAws ANN. tit. 12, ch. 16, § 8 (1956).

